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JUDGES AND OTHER LAWMAKERS: CRITICAL

CONTRIBUTIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

M

by Marcia E. Mulkey*
INTRODUCTION

ost of the dialog about environmental law enforcement starts with the assumption that the law is established and concentrates on those who are actively
engaged in assuring compliance with the laws. As a result, much
of the focus on building of enforcement capacity emphasizes the
identification, investigation and prosecutorial response to law
violations (or, as a supplemental or alternative approach, the
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education, encouragement, and inducement of law compliance).
This paper addresses the less frequently discussed but vitally
important role of law-makers in the success of enforcement and
compliance programs. Broadly defined, law-making involves
the activities of legislators and law drafters, regulators and regulation-drafters, permit writers, license preparers, and all others
who codify the applicable requirements as well as the activities
of judges and other adjudicators who apply the law to the facts
of particular cases in ways that define the scope and nature of
the law. Judges, of course, do more than "make law". They are
critical arbiters of the fairness of the system, help assure reasonable consistency among similarly situated cases, and provide
the mechanism through which intransigent law violators can be
compelled to comply.
This paper addresses the important ways in which law-making can and should enhance and support enforcement of environmental laws, whether at the sub-national, national or international levels. It also discusses the special role of judges (and
similar adjudicative decision-makers) in the environmental
enforcement process and draws conclusions about opportunities
to improve the effectiveness of law-making and judging in the
environmental law context. Because judicial law-making and
other critical judicial contributions to environmental law
enforcement occur only after and based in part upon law made
by legislators, regulators and permit preparers, law drafters and
judges are covered in "Enhancing Environmental Enforcement
in the Law-Drafting Process" and "The Special Role of the
Judiciary," and "Conclusions and Suggestions for Improving the
Effectiveness of Judges and Other Law-Makers" is devoted to
conclusions and suggestions applicable to either or both.

ENHANCING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT IN
THE LAW-DRAFTING PROCESS

ASSUMING THE ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
REQUIREMENTS

While many considerations influence the drafting of instruments imposing environmental requirements, none can be fully
effectuated without clarity in conveying the choices involved
*Marcia E. Mulkey is Visiting Professor of Law at Temple University's James
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and mechanisms to determine whether those choices are successfully implemented. Whether based on technology availability or desired levels of protection, on absolute values or costbenefit considerations, with detailed specificity or with performance expectations and flexibility of acceptable approaches1
the chosen requirements are, in the end, designed to be followed. Put simply, without compliance with the environmental
protection choices reflected in environmental law requirements,
such requirements are empty gestures at best and misleading
shams at worst. This section discusses a range of considerations
that go into assuring that environmental law drafting (whether
legislative, regulatory, or permitting) succeeds in creating
instruments that assure that compliance is achievable and that
non-compliance can be identified and addressed.

Technical and Economic Realism

As a threshold matter, requirements must be possible to
achieve and be practicable in the circumstances in which they

“Law-drafters at all levels
can be critical players in
assuring that helpful,
relevant, timely and
accurate information is
disseminated.”
are applied. While it is certainly appropriate to establish requirements that are not easy to achieve and that require costs and
effort (even considerable costs and effort), there is no way to
comply with-or to enforce successfully-requirements that are
plainly impractical. If requirements are too stringent, depend on
technology that does not exist and cannot be developed, are
effective so quickly that the regulated community cannot take
the necessary steps to comply or involve costs well beyond the
capacity of the regulated community to bear, the result can be a
lack of respect for compliance with law and a lack of willingness on the part of government to enforce.2
Legislative designers may feel that it is preferable to establish a very high standard in order to express the most desired
outcome or to accommodate public desires for the highest levels of protection. However, if the intent is ever to achieve such
outcomes and desires, it is generally advisable to describe such
high standards as goals, to establish them with a longer-term
effective date, or to limit their initial application only to larger
commercial entities or to situations where additional resources
can be made available to assure achievability. If there is not
some way to bridge the gap between the possible and the leg3

islatively required, the requirements are doomed to failure.3

Ease of Understanding; Accessibility

In the environmental field, where both the environmental
conditions of concern and the mechanisms to achieve environmental protection involve complex science and sophisticated
technology, it is often difficult to describe requirements with
clarity and simplicity. When one adds to the scientific complexity the additional challenges associated with policy considerations that encourage flexibility, avoidance of unnecessary burdens, and harnessing of market forces and other incentives, the
law-drafter is presented with many competing pressures.
Notwithstanding this difficult juggling act, the law-drafter cannot escape the plain truth that only those requirements that are
understood can be obeyed. The goal, for this purpose, is clarity,
understandability, and the avoidance of ambiguity. Achieving
that goal is no small task. Law drafters must clarify who has the
obligation.4 Definitions of key concepts are often critical, especially for distinguishing such things as product from waste.5 The
requirement should be clear about the time period covered,6
about the spatial reach, and about whether and when any exemptions or exceptions apply. 7
One effective technique for law drafters to assure that
requirements are achieving the intended message is to think
through how they themselves could go about avoiding having to
comply with the intent of the requirements by exploiting loopholes or taking advantage of unclear provisions.8 Similarly, the
requirements could be shared with persons expert in the regulated activity in a way that evaluates whether there is full and
accurate understanding.9 Persons with enforcement experience,
especially those experienced in field investigations and in development of legal actions in response to violations, can help identify potential problems with clarity. Based on this kind of feedback, the requirements can then be written to minimize the
opportunities for misunderstanding and evasion.
Of equal importance to understandability is accessibility of
information about applicable requirements. No matter how
clearly set forth, requirements that are not known to the regulated community will not be followed. On the other hand, complex
and highly technical requirements that are accompanied by adequate information and assistance delivered in a manner that is
workable and effective for regulated entities can often be fully
and effectively implemented. It is for these reasons that compliance assistance efforts by government, industry groups, private
consultants, attorneys, and others can play such a crucial role in
the implementation of environmental compliance programs.10
Law-drafters at all levels can be critical players in assuring that
helpful, relevant, timely and accurate information is disseminated through these various methods. Careful and understandable
documentation of legislative and regulatory history, accompanying compliance manuals, and other contemporaneous materials designed to both explain the requirements and to target relevant audiences with affirmative outreach efforts can all be part
of the law-drafters' role.11
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Clear and Defined Duties; Mandatory Language

No matter how carefully crafted or technically clear, legal
provisions can only give rise to a genuine duty if they are worded so that they specifically impose a duty. For example, a statement that a person (owner, operator, user) should act in a certain
way will generally be seen only as advice or encouragement.
The failure to do so would not clearly violate any enforceable
duty.12 While there could be a number of sound reasons to
include certain advisory or hortatory provisions in environmental regulatory instruments, such provisions should not be regarded as effective if the intention is to obtain full and meaningful
compliance. Words like must, is required to, mandatory, shall,
has the duty to all help to ensure that obligations bear the force
of law.13 The problem with choice of language that is not sufficiently mandatory tends to occur more frequently in the permit
or license drafting context, where there are fewer persons
involved in the drafting and the law-drafters may be less experienced or trained in choice of language considerations.
While clearly stating specific duties in the substantive provisions of environmental laws, regulations and permits may be
sufficient to assure enforceability, many law drafters also
address enforceability through enforcement provisions, which
not only establish such things as the forums for adjudication of
violations or the nature of available sanctions,14 but also specify what constitutes a violation or an unlawful act under the
law.15 While these "enforcement" provisions are most common
in statutes, they can also be included in regulations (so long as
they are consistent with the statute under which the regulations
are promulgated) and in permits or licenses (again, consistent
with the governing authority under which they are issued).
These kinds of provisions can have the effect of clarifying and
emphasizing the mandatory nature of the duties set forth elsewhere in the statute (or regulation or permit) and of assuring that
the regulated entity has full and fair notice of what actions or
omissions constitute enforceable violations. If this approach is
used, however, it is important to be sure that all the duties
described elsewhere in the law are brought into these provisions,
unless there is a specific intent to omit them and exempt them
from the duty to comply or to render that duty unenforceable
through sanctions or mandatory legal action.

Measurability; Ease of Detection

It is, of course, critical for both the regulated entity and for
the government to be able to detect, determine, and measure
whether there is compliance with a requirement. In the absence
of this fundamental capacity, neither can know whether compliance is achieved, and the government cannot carry any burden
of proving or demonstrating violations.16 Whether or not compliance measurement17 is made a part of the duties imposed, the
availability of reasonable, practicable approaches to measurement is critical to the effectiveness of any requirement. While
the technical complexity of particular requirements or policy
considerations relating to regulatory burdens or regulatory flexibility may lead to situations where simple, instantaneous, and
SPRING 2004

inexpensive compliance measures are not available, no requirement should be embraced until the law drafters can identify
some workable means for both the regulated entity and the
enforcing government to evaluate compliance. As noted here,
the law-drafters may provide for the enforcing governments to
rely on compliance demonstration requirements imposed on the
regulated, but in those situations, effective governmental
enforcement would depend on clarity about when and how such
demonstrations are or can be required.18

ASSURING THE AVAILABILITY OF ADEQUATE LEGAL TOOLS

While the emphasis of the previous section is upon the
characteristics of law drafting at the stage of designing and
imposing specific environmental protection requirements, this
section addresses the provisions of law which provide the
authorities and tools necessary to conduct effective enforcement
activities and create a climate of credible governmental capaci-

“At the heart of every
compliance approach is
the interaction between
the regulated community
and the enforcing
authority.”
ty to oversee, motivate, and mandate compliance. In many legal
regimes, provisions of law outside the four corners of specific
environmental statutes will have significant impact on both the
availability of particular enforcement instruments and options
and on the constraints and limits on their use.19 Notwithstanding
these more broadly applicable authorizations and limitations,
law drafters can and should consider whether and to what extent
environmental statutes and implementing regulations and
licenses might include provisions designed to assure the availability and responsible use of mechanisms to provide for comprehensive, efficient, effective, and fair enforcement.

Compliance Monitoring

At the heart of every compliance approach is the interaction
between the regulated community and the enforcing authority.20
Regardless of the enforcement "philosophy" adopted by government, which might range from a primarily incentive or
reward based approach through a mixed multiple-tool approach
to a purely deterrence/punitive approach,21 government will
need to be able to evaluate the extent, nature, and state of compliance. In order for government to motivate compliance by any
means or combination of means, it must have some capacity to
4

understand the extent of compliance and non-compliance with
enough particularity to identify the significance for success or
failure of the desired environmental protection. In order to plan
enforcement priorities and target limited resources, government
must have some understanding of what levels of compliance are
occurring for the various requirements and regulated sectors. In
order to become involved in motivating individual regulated
entities, government must have the capacity to investigate and
evaluate compliance at the entity or facility level.
Monitoring of compliance can be based on record-keeping
and self-reporting by regulated entities, inspections or other
investigations, and measurements of prevailing environmental
conditions. Each of these approaches can be enhanced by specific and thoughtful law drafting.

Self-Monitoring, Self-Record Keeping
and Self-Reporting

Law drafters may encourage or require self-monitoring,
self-record keeping, and self-reporting by regulated entities,
either as a broadly applicable part of general environmental law
requirements or with particularity for certain facilities, sizes of
operations, or periods of time. Such provisions shift much of the
burden for documenting compliance from government to the
regulated community. They sacrifice some of the independence
and credibility of government for the increased expertise, effi-

Inspections and Investigations

Even with strong and comprehensive self-monitoring and
reporting, governmental capacity for independent evaluation of
compliance activities will depend in part on the legal framework
provided for inspections and investigations. Effective inspections and investigations, for example, require adequate authority
for physical access to facilities, for opportunities to interview
knowledgeable persons, for review of books and records, for
obtaining physical samples, for use of measuring and analytical
equipment, or for taking photographs or other reproducing
images. All of these opportunities carry the potential for abuse or
overreaching, and law drafters must balance the need for effectiveness and efficiency against considerations of fairness and
burden.28 Because effective inspection authorities must be both
broad and relatively intrusive, measures to insure governmental
integrity acquire great importance. One way to build confidence
in the exercise of these authorities is to limit their use to persons
who have government-issued inspector credentials.29
Well-designed inspection regimes will account for circumstances in which entry is denied and assure that legal mechanisms are available for inspectors to obtain the aid of the courts,
the police, or some other appropriate authority that can both
assure necessary access and allow owners or operators to challenge whether the access is lawful. Where practicable, environmental investigative authorities should be consistent with comparable authorities under
other laws, such as health or occupational
safety provisions, that are likely to apply to the
same facilities. This helps promote cross-training of inspectors, sharing of expertise and
techniques, and effective information sharing
about facilities.

“The way in which judges
understand and apply existing law
serves as a powerful feedback loop
to the drafters of statutes,
regulations, and permits.”
ciency, and cost allocation associated with the regulated community. The required information can relate directly to compliance status22 or it can relate more broadly to environmental or
ambient conditions.23
These tools can make a big contribution to the enforcement
process by supplementing scarce government resources, and it is
almost always sensible for legislators to authorize governments
to require self-monitoring, record keeping, and reporting in
appropriate circumstances. The decision whether to actively
require such activities in implementing regulations and permits
should consider several factors: 1) practicality, costs, and burdens to the regulated community; 2) usefulness and intended purpose of the information;24 3) reliability and credibility;25 and 4)
ability of government to oversee and manage the information,26
including whether to make the information publicly available.27
5

Other Monitoring and Evaluative Tools

Law drafters may also consider providing
legal mechanisms to support government or private environmental monitoring, hot lines and
other citizen-based reporting, and cross-program information sharing.30 In addition to
authorizing these various options, legislators can provide for
funding to support them. Regulatory and permit drafters can
develop provisions that facilitate the use of these kinds of tools.31

Orders and Injunctive Authorities

Compliance Orders

Although the statutory and regulatory provisions may clearly impose duties, the government's detection of a violation is not
always sufficient to motivate the violator to comply. Legislative
drafters can provide government with the tools to require compliance. Even where the violator is willing to comply, it may not
always be possible to do so quickly, and good enforcement practice may warrant orderly oversight of a schedule and intermediate steps to compliance. Compliance orders can specify the steps
necessary to achieve compliance, establish reasonable but firm
deadlines, and create the potential for escalating consequences
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

for those who do not obey the requirements. Compliance orders
can also provide for the shutdown of operations, suspension of
permits or other measures where they are necessary to prevent
and address violations.
Compliance orders may be either administrative or judicial
(civil).32 They may be issued with the consent of the violator,
where the terms are negotiated and agreed to by both the enforcement agency and the violator (and in the case of the courts,
approved by the court.) Negotiated orders are usually termed
"consent orders" (or "consent court decrees") and may include
provisions for resolving disputes that arise under the order or an
agreed-upon penalty for violation of terms of the orders. Most
law drafters simply provide authority for the issuance of administrative or judicial orders and the authority for consent orders is
inferred from such authority.33 So long as general order authority is provided, compliance orders that cannot or should not be
obtained through negotiation and consent can nevertheless be
issued. If law drafters want to be sure that there is complete clarity about the availability of both consent orders and unilateral
orders, it could be useful to explicitly provide for both.34
Law drafters may explicitly provide that enforcement agencies can seek from the courts both preliminary compliance orders
(i.e. prior to resolution of the merits of the claims about the violations) and final orders (following resolution of the substantive
claims). Where fully matured legal systems provide for both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief for all types of proceedings,35 it may not be necessary to make any such explicit
provisions in specific environmental laws. In the absence of such
a system, law drafters may wish to explicitly authorize this kind
of flexibility, in light of the significant human health and environmental issues that can be present in some environmental
enforcement cases.
While court-issued orders will, by definition, require that
enforcing agencies bring the matter to the court, there can also be
situations where administratively issued orders will also come
before courts. If alleged violators choose to refuse to comply
with administrative compliance orders or to challenge such
orders,36 the matter could come to the court either through a
mechanism by which the alleged violator may appeal the order
to the court37 or through an approach by which the enforcing
authority may take the matter to the courts to seek judicial
enforcement of the order. It is useful for law-drafters to clarify
which of these routes is intended.38
It bears mention that compliance requirements can be
imposed in connection with criminal proceedings. At the point of
criminal proceedings where guilt has been established, the question of an appropriate sentence will arise. Specific criminal sanction authorities are discussed in section "Criminal Sanctions"
infra. In addition to sanctions, judges can impose conditions on
the criminal sentence which could include compliance requirements.39 While the authority to impose such conditions on sentences may generally be inferred from sentencing authority, any
uncertainty about that option could be addressed at the law
drafting stage.
SPRING 2004

Emergency Authorities

In certain, usually rare situations, government may need an
immediate and strong mechanism to ameliorate an imminent
hazard or to stabilize and address the adverse impacts associated with an emergency situation. Such situations involve harm
that is already occurring or appears imminent and may result
from accident or deliberate acts. Due to their emergency nature,
these situations may warrant action before an adequate investigation into causation or fault or they may warrant action independent of the issue of whether there has been a violation of law.
In these circumstances, emergency authorities can provide an
orderly, effective, and reasonably circumscribed governmental
response. Legislative provisions for emergency authorities can
take the form of administrative or judicial orders issued to own-

“... strong and swift
judicial action may be
essential to the integrity of
both the particular
enforcement situation and
the overall program for
compliance with
environmental law.”
ers, operators, or other responsible persons to stabilize the situation, contain or rectify the immediately hazardous conditions,
or provide necessary protections for affected persons.40
Whether the order authority is designed to be administratively
issued in the first instance with recourse to the courts to obtain
compliance with such orders or to be sought directly from a
court from the outset, either the overall judicial system or the
specific enabling legislation will need a mechanism for expedited proceedings and rapid action by the courts.

Sanction Authorities

Sanctions are the various forms of adverse consequences
that can be imposed upon violators as a tool either to motivate
the specific violators, usually called specific deterrence, or to
motivate other potential violators, usually called general deterrence.41 Sanctions can also be used to promote economic fairness by removing or reducing the competitive advantage that
may be gained by those who violate rather than bear the cost of
compliance.42 Generally, such adverse consequence may be
either civil (or administrative) monetary penalties or various
criminal sanctions.
6

Civil Monetary Penalties: Administrative and Judicial

As part of designing the authority to issue monetary penalties, choices must be made about where the authority is established (administrative, judicial, or both), the amounts and types
of such penalties, how they relate to multiple violations at the
same time and violations over time, and the procedures for
imposition, challenges, and appeals.
The threshold question of whether to provide for penalties
that may be imposed directly by administrative authorities or to
require that enforcement agencies seek penalties only through
the court system is closely related to a host of other considerations regarding administrative and judicial enforcement mechanisms.43 In broad terms, administrative authorities may be more
efficient, faster, and lower profile.
The counterpart effect of those
characteristics could mean that
administrative mechanisms involve
fewer safeguards and carry less
impact and clout. Administrative
penalty systems may be best
designed and used where relatively
modest penalties are appropriate or
where rapid and efficient responses
are particularly valued.
It is possible and may be
desirable, to provide for both
administratively and judicially imposed civil penalties. This
approach allows the enforcement agency to tailor the penalty
response to the facts and circumstances of each situation.
Where the amount of potential penalty is set lower for administrative than for judicial actions, lawmakers should set the
administrative limit high enough to provide for meaningful
use of the administrative tool.44
The legislative amount authorized for penalties involves a
number of complicated questions. It is extremely difficult if not
impossible to establish in legislation a precise penalty amount
that is appropriate across the full range of violations and violators. This problem can be addressed by establishing a set maximum penalty amount for each violation or for each day of violation. Under this approach, the implication is that the maximum penalty is designed for the most extreme, severe, and
compelling circumstances. In order for this assumption to
prove workable, it becomes important both to set the maximum
at a significantly higher level than would be appropriate for
many or most "normal" situations and for all concerned to
understand that this is the case. One way that statutes can
attempt to address the necessarily wide discretion that this
leaves to enforcement agencies and courts is to enumerate criteria that should be considered in setting penalties, ranging
from factors like seriousness and duration of violations to size
and compliance history of violators.45 In general, the maximum
penalty should be sufficient to recapture the economic advantages from non-compliance where appropriate.46 Setting a specific currency value for penalties can be complicated where

currencies are unstable and inflation is rapid or highly unpredictable. One answer can be a process for the fixed amount to
be automatically or easily adjusted.47

Criminal Sanctions

Wherever violations of environmental laws can be categorized as crimes, there will be some kind of provision for criminal
sanctions. In some systems, the criminal law contains all of the
various elements applicable to environmental crimes, and no
additional separate law-making is left to the drafters of the environmental statutes. For this approach, it may only be necessary
to define violations of the various environmental statutes as
crimes.48 Usually, though, either the environmental laws or the
general criminal laws or both will benefit from greater particularity and specificity regarding
both criminalization of environmental violations and the scope
and nature of criminal sanctions.
The nature, use, and significance of criminal sanctions for
environmental violations can vary
considerably across national legal
systems. If the environmental
protection approach includes
extensive and workable civil (perhaps including administrative)
penalty authority, criminal sanctions will likely be reserved for the more severe and egregious
cases and will be available only after the government has met a
high standard of proof.49 In systems with limited or no civil,
judicial, or administrative penalty authority, the criminal law
system may be used for much less serious violations across a
large segment of regulated behaviors.50 In this latter context,
both the degree of social stigma and the severity of criminal
sanctions is likely to cover a broader range to reflect the varying
degrees of importance attached to such violations.
Despite these widely variant approaches to the role of criminal enforcement in the environmental context, the basic types of
potential criminal sanctions are monetary (e. g. fines or forfeiture)
and various forms of loss of liberty (up to and including imprisonment).51 Lesser forms of restraints on liberty might include
mandatory public service, "house arrest," or constraints on travel
or movement. Since corporations usually cannot perform these
liberty related sanctions, criminal penalties on corporations or
other entities usually involve fines, although individual corporate
officers can be held liable in appropriate situations.52
In setting the statutory levels of applicable criminal sanctions, whether monetary amounts or duration of imprisonment
or other confinement, lawmakers face the same basic considerations as discussed regarding civil penalties, supra at "Civil
Monetary Penalties: Administrative and Judicial." And, as in
that context, where the issue is resolved through setting a maximum level for given violations or violation days, thought
should be given to providing guidance about the exercise of discretion in imposition of particular sanctions for specific cases.

“Environmental law is
emerging as a leading
area for international
judicial networking.”
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Such guidance might take the form of statutory criteria or
administratively issued detailed provisions.53

Citizen Suits and Other Enforcement Approaches

So far, this section has identified and discussed a range of
authorities and legal provisions that allow, support, or enhance
governmental exercise of the enforcement function. Certain
other governmental actions can have the effect of achieving
compliance or punishing or deterring violators. These include
barring violators from participating in government programs or
contracts,54 the termination or suspension of licenses or permits,55 or the shutting down of facilities or the seizure or stoppage of sales of goods.56 These kind of authorities can be established for administrative or judicial implementation and will
need mechanisms for challenges and appeals as ultimate
recourse to the courts to assure their effectiveness.
Although governmental entities are almost always likely to
be the prime enforcement operators under any legal system,
there may be significant impacts on environmental law compliance as the result of other actors and entities. Banks and other
lenders may condition funds availability on environmental compliance. Insurers may require compliance as a condition of
obtaining insurance or of recovery of claims. Institutional or
general public consumers of goods may condition purchases on
environmental law compliance. Private business associations
may establish formal or informal mechanisms to enhance member compliance. Environmental and other law drafters may wish
to encourage, facilitate, or even mandate certain of these private
mechanisms to support environmental law compliance. For
example, legal mechanisms for greater public access to information can facilitate all of these approaches.57
Private lawsuits represent another avenue for direct or de
facto enforcement of environmental laws. Some may be grounded in various common law principles, especially torts,58 but others may be based on express statutory provisions for citizen
enforcement of environmental requirements. These mechanisms
by which citizens effectively serve as private attorney generals
are generally called citizen suit provisions in U. S. federal environmental law.59 Law-makers may choose to make explicit provision for such causes of action and may provide implementing
details regarding who may bring such actions,60 where they may
be brought, what remedies may be sought,61 and against
whom.62 Either the environmental statute or more general legal
provisions may allow for the payment of attorneys fees to successful citizen plaintiffs.63

THE SPECIAL ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY

THE JUDICIARY AS LAW-MAKER

Without opening the debate of whether judges should be
activist and expansive in the development of law or confined
and constrained by narrow construction of applicable law,64 it is
safe to conclude that judges serve as law-makers in a number of
important ways. In each instance of the application of law to the
facts of a case, the judge will necessarily clarify and interpret
SPRING 2004

the law for that case.65 Whether in common law legal systems
driven by res judicata66 and stare decisis67 or in code-based systems where judicial opinion may only have persuasive effect in
later decisions, judicial decisions have a significant impact upon
subsequent cases with similar law or facts.68 The way in which
judges understand and apply existing law serves as a powerful
feedback loop to the drafters of statutes, regulations, and permits. In the particularization of injunctive relief, judges may
describe specific steps and elements of law compliance.
Through all of these routes, judges are either making law or
influencing the making of law.69
In its most fundamental sense, judicial interpretation and
implementation of legislation, regulations, licenses, or permits may come in the context of legal challenges to such provisions. Legislation may be challenged as unconstitutional or
ultra vires in some way.70 Regulations are frequently reviewable by courts.71 Permits, licenses, and administrative orders
may be appealable to the courts, before or after an administrative appellate process.72 Beyond direct legal challenges, all
forms of environmental legal requirements may be subject to
judicial interpretation, clarification,73 and application in the
context of enforcement cases, whether civil or criminal, or
whether initiated by government or by citizens. In all of these
types of judicial involvement, the opportunity is available for
judges to contribute materially to the clarity and enforceability of such provisions. In some situations, judicial interpretation may enhance the understandability and enforceability of
the requirements. In others, judicial review may identify
shortcomings in existing legislation that impede or prevent
effective enforcement.74

THE IMPACT OF THE JUDICIARY ON THE CLIMATE OF
COMPLIANCE, RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW,
SOCIETAL NORMS AND EXPECTATIONS

A fundamental and central tenet of successful environmental protection compliance and enforcement programs is
the credibility and integrity of the government.75 If government is or is perceived to be corrupt or even merely capricious
and unfair, it is unlikely that the regulated community or the
society at large will support environmental compliance
goals.76 An independent, professional, and credible judiciary
is a key component of the rule of law, respect for law, and
belief in governmental integrity.77 Because of its role as an
arbiter of competing interests and its neutrality in any specific
dispute, the judiciary's upholding of appropriate and wellgrounded environmental protection laws and actions to implement them adds materially to their acceptance by society at
large. By the same token, the judiciary's rejection of inappropriate application of such laws increases the trust of all in the
system and reinforces the expectation that such laws can and
will be soundly applied.78
By contrast, if the judiciary exhibits ineptitude, corruption,
bias, or hostility to legitimate legislative and executive action,
the balance necessary for acceptance of the entire governmental
8

structure is undermined and environmental law compliance (and
other types of law compliance) will suffer or completely collapse. It is, therefore, not exaggeration to say that as the judiciary goes, so goes environmental law compliance.

THE BALANCING ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY TO
MODERATE PROSECUTORIAL EXCESS OR ADDRESS
OFFICIAL MALFEASANCE

While, as discussed supra at "Orders and Injunctive
Authorities," legal authority to conduct effective investigation
and legal tools to assure a strong, behavior-changing response
are critical aspects of effective environmental legislation, the
exercise of such authorities, and use of such tools should be
responsible, fair, and consistent with the rights of affected persons and entities. These are considerable powers, and therefore
susceptible to considerable abuse.
An independent judiciary provides a mechanism for
accountability and oversight that can both deter misuse of
enforcement power and correct and redress such misuse when it
occurs. The courts may establish practices or implement legislative provisions that prevent the use of wrongly obtained evidence,79 that impose sanctions on offending officers or agencies,80 and that provide compensation to wronged individuals or
entities.81 By these express measures and a myriad of specific
approaches as matters come before the courts, judges can establish the tone for the exercise of investigative and prosecutorial
discretion and for professionalism and ethical standards in environmental law enforcement.

THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN ASSURING THE
TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE USE OF LEGAL ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS

While the statutory availability of adequate enforcement
mechanisms is a necessary starting point and the capacity and
will to exercise these authorities is prerequisite, the courts provide the ultimate recourse where there is resistance to investigation and unwillingness on the part of the regulated community
to comply with the demands of the enforcement authorities. In
the absence of a judicial backstop, both intransigent violators
and those who are generally responsive to clear governmental
action but unwilling to comply without credible government
enforcement,83 will likely continue to violate. If the involvement of the judiciary leads to inordinate delays,84 major unpredictability, or a perception of corruption or incompetence, the
judicial backstop is essentially nullified.
As part of a system that permits and promotes effective
environmental law compliance, a credible and capable judiciary
is crucial. In certain specific situations, such as a refusal of
access to inspectors, emergency conditions, or persistent intransigence by violators, strong and swift judicial action may be
essential to the integrity of both the particular enforcement situation and the overall program for compliance with environmental law. In the more comprehensive context of the complete
docket of environmental enforcement matters that come before
the judiciary, a consistent, fair, and sufficiently forceful
9

response to demonstrated violations becomes a foundation of
the entire system of environmental law enforcement.

JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE OVERALL
TRANSPARENCY AND OPENNESS OF ENFORCEMENT

Although statutory provisions and choices by implementing
enforcement agencies generally control the extent and nature of
the overall transparency and openness of a government's
approach to compliance and enforcement, there are a number of
mechanisms through which the courts can contribute to these
important aspects of sound environmental law compliance programs. Court systems often, for example, control the manner
and extent to which cases are publicly reported and the ease with
which they can be accessed by practitioners and others.85 Courts
can support and even undertake efforts to compile information
about cases and decisions and to analyze trends or patterns in
them.86 These kinds of efforts may be particularly important in
code-based legal systems which may lack the long history of
ready availability of relevant prior court decisions.87

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
FOR IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF JUDGES
AND OTHER LAW-MAKERS

TRAINING AND SKILLS ENHANCEMENT

As a starting point for skills development, law school curricula would benefit greatly from enhanced attention to statutory and regulatory drafting, including enforceability considerations.88 Specialized continuing education and training for
law-makers in drafting of substantive provisions for enforceability and in development of adequate statutory enforcement
provisions is available, but relatively rare.89 Judicial training
is increasingly organized, expected, and enhanced in the
U.S.,90 though it has not been without controversy. Other
nations also make extensive use of judicial training programs
and institutions.91
Because environmental cases can be very complex in both
law and facts, judges might also benefit from some specialized
training in the subject-matter of environmental protection.92
While "environmental courts" are quite rare,93 sub-specialization within a court is a somewhat more frequent phenomenon,
either explicitly or informally.94 Usually, though, environmental
cases are likely to be assigned in a less systematic way and it
becomes important that the whole judiciary be better prepared to
understand and act responsibly in environmental cases.95 A
number of recent international initiatives are attempting to promote this kind of subject-matter awareness-raising and training
for judges, nationally, regionally, and world-wide.96

NETWORKING

Interaction, cooperation, and collaboration among professionals with similar responsibilities, challenges, and experience
can be both useful and personally satisfying. Networking across
organizational, political, jurisdictional, or geographic boundaries can provide an efficient, nonbureaucratic mechanism for
shared learning and skills development.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

At the international level, a rich and growing body of literature now identifies international networks of various types of
government officials and others with language as strong as a
"new world order."97 These kind of networks can and do operate
among legislators, agency personnel, and judges98 and can operate at the international, national, or subnational level. While
organized activities among legislators or judges are increasing,
especially at the international level,99 networking around a specific substantive area of the law is still relatively rare. Happily,
environmental law is emerging as a leading area for international judicial networking. When one reflects on the fact that there
are only a small handful of specialized environmental courts of
any type in any nation and that neither civil nor criminal dockets
are by any means dominated by environmental cases, this level
of international judicial engagement is somewhat extraordinary.
A group of more than one hundred and thirty judges from more
than 60 countries met in Johannesburg on the eve of the World
Summit on Sustainable Development and produced a "Statement
of Principles" relating to justice and the environment,100 a truly
unusual development in the history of foreign affairs.
The Johannesburg meeting of the jurists followed on the
labors of the Division of Policy Development and Law of the
United Nations Environment Program, which had been working
for several years in regional judicial symposia and other meetings, and has been followed by several other, mostly regional
gatherings of judges, some quite prominent, who appear committed to judicial networking on environmental topics.101
Among the topics of evident interest to these judicial networks
is enforcement and compliance. This robust model of international judicial networking in the area of environmental law
enforcement can serve as a model for similar international,
national, or subnational networking among legislators, regulatory drafters, permit writers, and all other types of actors in the
area of environmental law enforcement.102

EXPORTATION OF BEST PRACTICES

Successful models from other systems or experiences can
be adopted or adapted if and when certain preconditions are met.
The "best practices", in this instance for law-drafting and judging, must be known and understood by those who might adopt
them, must be adaptable to the "importing" situation, and must
be sufficiently admired and respected to receive a fair and full
consideration. Education and training (supra at "Training and
Skills Enhancement") and networking (supra at "Networking")
contribute to these preconditions. So do all the means by which
the activities of law drafters and judges are made transparent
(infra at "Feedback, Accountability, and Measurement") and
supported by legislative or regulatory histories and other amplifying materials (supra at "The Balancing Role of the Judiciary
to Moderate Prosecutorial Excess or Address Official
Malfeasance").
Fortunately, most legislative and regulatory materials, as
well as many individual permits, are typically publicly available
and easy to access. Some developing countries and systems without fully developed judicial administrations may not routinely
SPRING 2004

and comprehensively publish judicial decisions, but a large volume of "judge-made law" is also widely and readily available
from throughout the world. It only remains, then for comparative
environmental law studies to focus on enforcement and enforceability issues. Judges also have the option and the opportunity to
turn to extra-territorial sources for relevant and useful models
and sources of law, insight, reasoning, or perspective.103

FEEDBACK, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND MEASUREMENT

As noted, supra at "The Judiciary as Law-Maker," judges
perform a form of feedback and accountability function for
environmental law drafters and for environmental enforcement
agencies which can contribute in major ways to the overall credibility and effectiveness of the system. In a more judiciary-specific way, courts, judges, and the judicial system can adopt
mechanisms and processes which provide feedback to the judiciary and which improve accountability and measurement of
judicial effectiveness. For example, the judicial system can
track and report on such measures as time to decision, frequency of reversal by higher courts, back-logs of undecided cases,
and the like. Academic and other independent institutions can be
encouraged to study and evaluate the judiciary.104 All of these
approaches can be adapted with particular attention to judging
in environmental cases and environmental issues.105

CONCLUSION

Effective law enforcement and reliable compliance with
environmental laws are necessary if environmental protection
efforts are to produce their desired results. This article has identified the critical role that lawmakers, both as drafters and
judges, can and should play in promoting environmental compliance. While other governmental and non-governmental
actors are often the primary focus of thinking, scholarship, and
writing about environmental compliance and enforcement, the
particulars identified and elaborated here illustrate the fundamental foundation function of law-making and the rich opportunities for judges and other lawmakers to promote and enhance
environmental law compliance and environmental protection
throughout the world.
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Proposal for Reform, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 87, 87-92 (distinguishing
between preliminary and permanent injunctions in terms of their nature,
duration, purpose, and effect, particularly that preliminary injunctions lack
specific time restrictions but are typically temporary, while permanent
injunctions are typically indefinite). For general injunctive procedures
under U.S. law, see FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a) (preliminary injunction); FED. R.
CIV. P. 65 (injunctions); FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (summary judgment); FED. R.
CIV. P. 59, 60, 62 (judgment rules).
36 Such refusals and challenges may be motivated by a simple unwillingness to comply or by a sincere belief that the order is not proper based on
the facts or the law.
37 Such an approach could provide for an intermediate appeal within the

administrative agency, perhaps to an administrative tribunal whose functions are separate from the enforcement arm of the agency. See United
States Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (provision that the
adjudicating agency official not be responsible to or subject to the officials
engaged in enforcement functions).
38 See General Electric Co. v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 360 F.3d 188

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that while the plain language of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) prohibits federal courts from reviewing challenges to
removal or remedial actions under the statute, General Electric still can sue
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Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) and (g)(3). Under EPA policies, EPA
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43 See discussion of order authorities supra Section “Compliance Orders.”

44 For a detailed discussion comparing administrative and judicial
enforcement in the U.S. and Dutch systems see D.J. Van Zeben & M.E.
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